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THE FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE AFTER THE
COMMENTARY: LET IT GO
Oliver Zhong*
This Note proposes the abolishment of the failing company defense in merger con-
trol law. This call for reform is based on a comprehensive critique, which consists
of a revisit of the doctrinal history, a survey of problems in current practice, and
an inquiry into the normative merits of both the status quo and alternative plans.
The reform advocated will purify the doctrine and improve the practice with
minimum adjustments, in line with the ongoing movement to modernize merger
review with the publication of the Commentary to the Merger Guidelines.
INTRODUCTION
The failing company defense is the longest surviving myth' in
federal merger control jurisprudence.2 Generally considered a ju-
dicial creation of the 1930 Supreme Court decision of International
Shoe,3 the defense is older than the modern Section 74 jurispru-
dence itself. Following its long course of genesis, one would expect
it to be either firmly established and embedded in contemporary
practice or disfavored and dropped into historical oblivion. Nei-
ther is true today. Although the basic import of the defense is
simple-it exonerates mergers that are otherwise illegal if one of
the parties is "failing"-its application remains ambiguous.5 It has
* Oliver Q.C. Zhong expects to receive his J.D. from the University of Michigan Law
School in 2008. He holds a M.P.Aff. in Public Affairs from the University of Texas, Austin
and a LL.B. from Shanghai International Studies University, China. This Note was originally
prepared for an advanced antitrust seminar by Professor Thomas Kauper at the University of
Michigan Law School during the fall 2006 semester. This Note was a co-finalist of the 2007
William E. Swope National Antitrust Award. He thanksJones Day attorneys Kevin McDonald,
Joe Sims, Phillip Proger, and others for their individual and collective comments. He also
thanks the editors at the Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their outstanding work.
1. Through meticulous research, Martin Connor first found the defense a "myth" as
early as 1960. Martin F. Connor I1l, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49
GEO. L.J. 84 (1960). A quarter century later, however, the defense continued to exist, and
Professor Friedman rightfully called it a "survivor." Richard D. Friedman, Untangling the
Failing Company Defense, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1375 (1986).
2. Clayton Act § 7 applies to horizontal mergers as well as vertical and conglomerate
mergers. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2000)). This Note focuses on horizontal mergers as they represent a large ma-
jority of merger cases.
3. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
4. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
5. See infra Part II.B.
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been only sporadically tested in litigation, where the courts have
not provided helpful clarification.6 The Supreme Court has never
explicitly upheld its application 7 and has not substantively ruled on
a related case for thirty-two years.8 On the other hand, despite be-
ing subject to both scorn9 and indifference,'0 the defense is "alive
and well,"'" frequently, if not routinely, raised in the proceedings of
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
("FrFC")1 2 and often determinative of the agencies' decisions re-
garding whether to launch a challenge to proposed mergers.13
6. Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and
Failure, 71 CAL. L. REV. 497, 526 n.67 ("Subsequent [to the 1950 amendments to the Clayton
Act,] Supreme Court decisions are not particularly helpful on the point, formulating stan-
dards for the defense with little or no explanation.") (citations omitted).
7. Kevin Arquit, The Failing Firm Defense and Related Issues, FTC: WATCH, Apr. 29, 1991.
Cf infra note 80.
8. The last such ruling was United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974),
in 1974, which did not cite but distinguished the failing company defense. Gen. Dynamics 415
U.S. at 506-08; see also infra Part II.B. The same term also saw two other antitrust cases. See
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Conn. Nat'l
Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
9. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Remarks: The Failing Firm Doctrine, 50 ANTITRUST LJ. 247,
247-52 (1982) ("[The failing firm doctrine is] a mass of contradictions."); Failing Firms and
Industries, FTC: WATCH, Nov. 20, 1995, at 5 (citing former FTC competition enforcer Steven
Newborn: "[T]he failing firm defense is simply an abomination [...] a blight on precise
antitrust enforcement.").
10. For example, the FTC has never upheld the defense in a litigated case. "Merging
companies should avoid wasting their time with a failing company defense in most cases."
Tough Hospital Merger Enforcement to Continue at FTC, Antitrust Division, FTC: WATCH, Feb. 25,
1991, at 3 (quoting then FTC Competition Director Kevin Arquit).
11. Lou Whiteman, Failing Airlines Stand Better Chance of Merging, DAILY DEAL, Feb. 8,
2002 (reporting on the successful merger between the AMR Corp., parent of American
Airlines, and the TWA Airlines Inc. largely based on the theory that TWA could not survive
independently). "There is a myth that the failing firm defense rarely, if ever, succeeds.
The reality is that the defense is alive and well." Id. (quoting attorneyJoel Chefitz).
12. Kauper, supra note 6, at 529.
Most antitrust observers, especially those not involved directly in the enforcement
process, tend to view the failing company defense as a bit of esoterica, a kind of foot-
note that must be included in any description of merger policy but that is of little real
consequence. If my own experience is any measure, the opposite is true. The defense,
or something akin to it, is frequently raised before the [Justice] Department. Evalua-
tion of these arguments is something of an institutional nightmare, particularly with
respect to the alternative purchaser requirement.
Id.
According to Donald Baker, another former assistant deputy attorney general for anti-
trust, "[tihe whole 'failing company' issue is of immense practical importance .... " Donald
I. Baker: How to Play the Failing Company Merger Game with the Bureaucrats in Washington, FTC:
WATCH, Oct. 21, 1991, at 13-15.
13. Paul M. Laurenza, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Failing Company: An Updated
Perspective, 65 VA. L. REv. 947, 947-48 (1979).
[VOL. 41:3
The Failing Company Defense
Federal merger law, in the meantime, has changed fundamen-
tally. The battlefield has shifted from ex post rule of reason
inquiries in the courtroom4 (frequently at the Supreme Court 5) to
ex ante pre-merger filing and investigations at the enforcement
agencies, l16 which increasingly employ efficiencies analysis" and the
technical expertise of economists. As such, the prosecutorial dis-
cretion wielded by the Justice Department and the FTC has
become highly dispositive of not only individual merger plans, but,
more importantly, of the merger jurisprudence proper, because
the government sues less frequently (and even less so on the mer-
its) and private suits are extremely difficult. 8 Since 1968, the
agencies have introduced more transparency and predictability to
the exercise of such powerful discretion over mergers by the adop-
tion of merger guidelines.'9 In March 2006, the agencies published
14. PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 678-80
(6th ed. 2004) ("Before the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, merger cases had to be
brought under the Sherman Act. Even after 1914, however, many early cases continued to be
brought tinder the Sherman Act in large part because Clayton Act § 7 was originally more
limited in its application than it is today") (discussing seminal cases of N. Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495 (1948)); see also STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 315 (1993).
15. Seventeen merger decisions came out of the Supreme Court from 1950 to 1974.
See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65
ANTITRUST LJ. 865, 866 (1997). The important reason is the Expediting Act, ch. 544, § 2, 32
Stat. 823 (1903) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 28, 29 (2000)), which made civil anti-
trust action brought by the government directly appealable to the Supreme Court. Id.
16. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 and 28 U.S.C.) provides
parens patriae authority to state attorneys general and wider investigation power for the
Justice Department, but it was its pre-merger filing requirement that vastly changed the
merger law and practice. For a review of the HSR Act's effect on merger practice, see Sims &
Herman, supra note 15.
17. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Effi-
ciencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 208 (2003).
18. Thomas J. Campbell, The Efficiency of the Failing Company Defense, 63 TEx. L. REv.
251, 252 n.8, 283 (1984) (citing Neil B. Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index and the New Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEX.
L. REv. 453, 454 n.5 (1983)). A competitor's challenge to a merger can be perceived as evi-
dence of competitive effects of the merger because it is a sign that the competitor is worried
about lower prices post-merger. Id.
19. The merger guidelines have undergone three major revisions. The current version
is the 1992 Guidelines with 1997 revisions. U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/horiz.book/hmgl.html [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The first Guidelines were
published by the Justice Department alone in 1968, but they did not achieve importance
until thejoint issuance of the 1982 Guidelines. See generally Robert Pitofsky, MergerAnalysis in
the '90s: The Guidelines and Beyond-Overview, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 147 (1992). The consensus is
that the 1982 Guidelines are "a vast improvement intellectually" over the state of thinking
about merger enforcement previously. Id. at 148. See generally Kauper, supra note 6.
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the Commentary on the Merger Control Guidelines (the "Com-
mentary"), ° marking a solid next step in the merger law
enforcement reform process.
The failing company defense fits strangely in this development.
A telling indication of the misfit is that the Commentary reaffirms
its part in the merger review routine but offers virtually no comment
on it. Whatever the reason for this omission,1 the vacuum is dis-
quieting, particularly in view of the rest of the document, which is
otherwise concrete and detail-oriented. 2' The problem is not new.
The agencies had accepted the defense as part of established law,
but only grudgingly, because the defense would force them to bless
mergers which were prima facie illegal and which might not have
any valid rebuttal, and to do so without a clear and convincing ra-
tionale. As a natural response, the agencies have since interpreted
and applied the defense narrowly.23 However, the real damage of
the defense manifests itself not when it "succeeds" in the sense of
upholding an otherwise meritless merger, but when it exists.24 The
distortion of antitrust law enforcement will persist should the
equivocation about the failing company defense continue. It is
time to solve the problem.
This Note develops a renewed criticism of the failing company
defense and proposes a three-part approach to prepare for merger
jurisprudence without it: abolishing the per se defense; recogniz-
ing specific, eligible efficiencies for exiting assets; and adopting ad
hoc statutory exemptions. The methodology is largely normative. A
major impetus may be necessary in Congress, the courts, the agen-
cies, or the Bar for effecting an ideological realignment that is
radical on its face, even if moderate in effect.25 The goal is, rather,
20. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
215247.pdf [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
21. The Commentary itself explains that "[a]pplication of the Guidelines' provisions
relating to failure and exiting assets is not discussed ... because those provisions are very
infrequently applied." Id. at 4. This is probably an honest statement. But see infra note 22.
22. It is remarkable that the failing company defense, one of the five components of
the Guidelines review, becomes an empty appendix in a 71-page document aimed at bring-
ing more predictability and transparency to antitrust law application. See COMMENTARY,
supra note 21, at v. One is not to blame for keeping a harmless appendix. But if it causes
constant problems, no action is not the right solution.
23. The clear exemplar is the fact that the failing company test in the Guidelines is on
its face more stringent than the judicial standard. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying
text.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. For example, the initiative has escaped the contemplation of the Antitrust Mod-
ernization Commission, set up by Congress to gather recommendations for antitrust law
modernization, Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)), which has
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to present a reasoned case to purify the law and at the same time
bring more economy and confidence to the existing practice with
minimum adjustments.
Part I revisits the doctrinal history of the defense from a contex-
tual perspective and demonstrates that the defense is a legal
anomaly that has evaded its exit in the shift of ideological cycles.,
Part II surveys the defense in contemporary practice and the prob,
lems it causes. Part III turns to a pure normative inquiry, seeking
reasons why the defense should be supported and finding none.
Part IV lays out a reform and explains its consequences.
I. THE FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE AS A LEGAL DOCTRINE
There seems little secret left in the doctrinal history of the fail-
ing company defense. It is settled hornbook law2 6 that the defense
was created by the Supreme Court in International Shoe, codified by
Congress in the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950,27 modernized by the
Court in Citizen Publishing,28 and readily adopted by the agencies in
the Guidelines.29 It is acknowledged that the defense lacks textual
statutory basis, 30 but the standard view holds that the legislative his-
tory of the 1950 amendments evinces such a clear intent in favor of
the defense that it must be taken as firmly established.3 ' A contex-
tual revisit of the history challenges this view.
A. International Shoe: The Doctrine It Did Not Create
Back in May 1921, this merger was no small news. In the depths
of an industry-wide recession, the International Shoe Company,
the largest shoe manufacturer in the United States, acquired the
W.H. McElwain Company, the largest in New England, with capital
presented its report to Congress in May 2007. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), available at http://www.anc.gov/reportrecommendation/
amc-final-report.pdf.
26. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPE-
TITION AND ITS PRACTICE 551 (3d ed. 2005).
27. Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, §§ 7, 11, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125-28 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2000)).
28. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
29. GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 5.
30. 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKEMP, ANTITRUST LAw 951, at 243-44
(2d ed. 2006).
31. Id. at 243.
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stock . The FTC found, as did the First Circuit," that the two com-
panies were in substantial competition, that the acquisition
substantially lessened such competition, and that it thus offended
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
3 4
Justice Sutherland, writing for the Supreme Court, reversed the
circuit court for two reasons. First, there was no substantial compe-S35
tition between the two companies. Second, in a frequendy quoted
passage, Justice Sutherland wrote:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with re-
sources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so
remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure
with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the com-
munities where its plants were operated, we hold that the
purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there being no
other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen
competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the
purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious
consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of
law prejudicial to the public and does not substantially lessen
competition or restrain commerce within the intent of the
Clayton Act. To regard such a transaction as a violation of law,
32. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 29 F.2d 518, 520 (1st Cir. 1928). The stock
purchase was crucial for the FTC to acquire jurisdiction under the original Section 7, which
applied to stock sales only:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also
in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community,
or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2000)) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, it may seem curious why International was not astute enough to design an
asset acquisition to avoid antitrust problems. According the circuit court's findings, Interna-
tional Shoe realized the difference only after the FTC had instituted proceedings. Int'l Shoe,
29 F.2d at 522-23. Apparently on the advice of counsel, International Shoe then "divested"
all its McElwain stock and effectively transmuted the stock acquisition into an asset acquisi-
tion. Id. The First Circuit found that this "pseudo purchase of assets" did not affect the
FTC's jurisdiction, per Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). Id.
33. Id.
34. Clayton Act, § 7.
35. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930). Since ninety-five
percent of McElwain shoes were sold in "large centers of population to meet a distinct de-
mand for that particular product," and ninety-five percent of International shoes were sold
in "the rural sections and the small towns to meet a wholly different demand," to hold them
in competition "is to apply the word 'competition' in a highly deceptive sense." Id.
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as this Court suggested in United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., would
"seem a distempered view of purchase and result." See also
American Press Ass'n v. United States.3
So was born the failing company defense, as the majority sees it.
From hindsight, the "grave probability of business failure" lan-
guage not only is the first articulation of the defense, but has
become a lasting expression of it.37 But this emphasis mistakes the
facts for the holding of the case and creates a "doctrine" that is re-
pugnant to the original context of International Shoe.
1. Immediate Context
Within Justice Sutherland's second reason, it is obvious that the
real holding was based on the Sherman Act jurisprudence. The
intent element38 and public cost-benefit balancing test39 are hall-
marks of the rule-of-reason analysis.40 The direct references to US
Steel and American Press Association, both classic Sherman Act cases,
dispel any ambiguity.41 Whatever the facts of the case illuminate,
they cannot alter the construct of law that produced the holding.
In addition, the nexus between the first reason and the second
one, the former of which was clearly based on Sherman Act meth-
ods, strengthens the conclusion that both were integral parts of a
rule-of-reason holding. Some commentators do not see this nexus
because they believe that the first reason was sufficient for the out-
come of the case and the second was pure dictum 43 or, more
36. Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
37. This language is still used verbatim in describing the financial distress prong of the
failing company litmus test. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974); United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Citizen Publ'g Co.
v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
38. Int ' Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302 ("[N] ot with a purpose to lessen competition ...
39. Id. ("[W]ith the effect of mitigating serious injurious consequences otherwise
probable ... no..... prejudicial to the public....").
40. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
41. In United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), the court found that grave
injury would occur to the public if the acquisition was disallowed. In American Press Ass'n v.
United States, 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917), the impact on the public was considered insignificant.
42. After finding that International and McElwain did not compete with each other,
that part of the holding was reached not on the modern notion of market definition, but on
standard Sherman Act language. Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 297-98 (citing Standard Oil Co. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 282 F. 81 (3d Cir. 1922); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261
U.S. 463 (1923)).
43. See, e.g., Edward 0. Correia, Re-examining the Failing Company Defense, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 683 (1996).
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charitably, "unnecessary for the outcome.",44 If this view were ac-
cepted, it would virtually destroy the doctrinal underpinnings of
the failing company defense. 45 Alternatively, if one holds a temper-
ate reading glass and tries to find meaning in both reasons, there is
not only textual support that they are conjunctive," but a strong
logical link as well.47
While it is undisputed that early Clayton Act jurisprudence bor-
rowed heavily from that of the Sherman Act, mainstream
commentators see it as a separate line of interest and ignore its
disposition over the presumption of what came to be known as the
failing company defense." There was no affirmative defense in In-
ternational Shoe. The loss to the shareholders and injuries to the
community-what Professor Friedman aptly called the "hardship
rationale"4-was not a justification to an illegality, but only a factor
under a rule-of-reason balancing test that absolved a merger from
illegality. Unless it comes to terms with this basic fact, any debate
regarding the normative justification of an absolute defense would
only exacerbate, not ease, the doctrinal confusion.
2. Ideological Context
If there is still doubt as to how to read International Shoe within its
text, the largely overlooked ideological context of the Taft Court
dispels it. One extraordinary feature of the entire opinion is how
the Supreme Court differed with the First Circuit over facts, which
had been investigated and presented by the FTC, and effectively
relied on its own findings for the ruling. ° The only way to fully
comprehend this rather extraordinary choice is to read it together
44. Kauper, supra note 6, at 526 n.67.
45. Indeed, if International Shoe were tried today, the holding would almost certainly
stop at the end of the first part, because the parties apparently did not compete in the same
geographic market or in the same product market. At the time International Shoe was de-
cided, it was a fortiri so because then Section 7 was concerned only with competition
between the two firms in question. The absence of such would be dispositive as a matter of
law.
46. See Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 303 ("For the reasons appearing under each of the two
foregoing heads of this opinion, the judgment below must be reversed") (emphasis added).
Some commentators saw these reasons as alternatives. See e.g., Campbell, supra note 18, at
253; Laurenza, supra note 13, at 949.
47. In effect, the first reason establishes that there is no current substantial competi-
tion, and the second proves that there is no future substantial competition. Viewed together,
these reasons make a full case that there can be no substantial lessening of competition.
48. See sources cited supra note 14.
49. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1377.
50. This was the main objection ofJustice Stone's dissent. Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 303-06
(Stone,J, dissenting).
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with Curtis Publishing," a case decided seven terms earlier by the
same court and cited in International Shoe. There, the court effec-
tively dismissed all fact-finding done by the executive agency and
gave federal courts the power to probe the evidence anew.53
Another notable aspect of International Shoe is the Court's defer-
ence to private contract. In an almost coaching tone, Justice
Sutherland told the First Circuit that it should have recognized
McElwin's bona fide search for alternative purchasers. In effect,
Justice Sutherland recited his gospel that individuals should be
presumed to possess the fine judgment and more importantly the
right to dispose of their private property, so long as "not... preju-
dicial to the public,"5 free from undue government second-
guessing and paternalistic judgment.
56
The common theme is clear enough: curtailing the govern-
ment's power to interfere with private contracts. Such was typical
of the antitrust jurisprudence of the time. Simply put, in allowing
two large shoemakers to merge, the Taft Court was nowhere near
espousing a liberal coup that manipulated antitrust law to amelio-
rate certain community hardship. Instead, the merger sent the
message that the private contract as a whole was not prejudicial
enough to the public to justify government interference. Justice
Sutherland and his ideological allies on the bench57 were unri-
valled in the entire Supreme Court history in their adherence to
this conservative philosophy, one which was intrinsically hostile to
the government's power against private persons, notwithstanding
51. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
52. Int l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 297.
53. Chief Justice Taft and Justice Brandeis doubted the wisdom of such a fact-finding
role for the courts, albeit via a concurring opinion. Curtis Publ'g, 260 U.S. at 582 (Taft, C.J.,
concurring).
54. Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302.
As between [the alternatives suggested by the First Circuit) and all other alternatives,
and the alternative of a sale such as was made, the officers, stockholders and credi-
tors, thoroughly familiar with the factors of a critical situation and more able than
commission or court to foresee future contingencies, after much consideration, felt
compelled to choose the latter alternative. There is no reason to doubt that in so do-
ing they exercised ajudgment which was both honest and well informed ....
Id.
55. Id.
56. Nothing better portrays the justice's philosophy than (and only that philosophy
can explain) his citation to Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64
(1827), a case endorsing private control over property, written by the great Justice Joseph
Story.
57. Justices van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler. See Christopher Tomlins, The Four
Horsemen, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 246, 246-48
(Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
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the advent of ever-expanding big businesses and the very concen-
tration of wealth and power that many viewed as the chief initial
concerns of the Sherman Act and, derivatively, the early Clayton
Act.58 In the end, the anti-regulation philosophy decided Interna-
tional Shoe. To read the case otherwise would be, at a minimum,
historically disingenuous and fundamentally flawed.
B. Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950: "Codification" without Text
There is reason to believe that the misreading of International
Shoe was not due to an endemic myopia, but to a practical judg-
ment that, since Congress so clearly intended to favor the defense,
the academic niceties in International Shoe do not matter. 9 The fact
that the "doctrine" received no development in its first twenty
yearso° could not mean much, either. This view would have merit
58. These justices had been dominant until after the New Deal, which eventually sent
them into minority and the page of extremism in the book of history. In Home Building. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisde, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), one of the most infamous moments in the Con-
tract Clause history, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law rewriting the terms of
home mortgage contracts. The four justices dissented vehemently. The very same Justice
Sutherland lamented:
Few questions of greater moment than that just decided have been submitted for ju-
dicial inquiry during this generation. He simply closes his eyes to the necessary
implications of the decision who fails to see in it the potentiality of future gradual but
ever-advancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private and public contracts. The
effect of the Minnesota legislation, though serious enough in itself, is of trivial signifi-
cance compared with the far more serious and dangerous inroads upon the
limitations of the Constitution which are almost certain to ensue as a consequence
naturally following any step beyond the boundaries fixed by that instrument. And
those of us who are thus apprehensive of the effect of this decision would, in a matter
so important, be neglectful of our duty should we fail to spread upon the permanent
records of the court the reasons which move us to the opposite view.
Id. at 448 (Sutherland,J., dissenting).
The similarities between International Shoe and Blaisdell are revealing. Debtor discontent
had been a major social economic problem since the early American history, which was
readily recognized by the Blaisdell dissent through thorough historical research. Id. (Suther-
land, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the extreme gravity of the emergency" can be established
"beyond all question"). Seeing that the conservatives on the bench weren't even moved by
such serious community distress, it is implausible to believe that a mere threat of bankruptcy
in International Shoe could have persuaded them to change heart.
59. See, e.g., 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, at 243 ("Whether justified or not
on administrative or economic grounds, the legislative history of § 7 of the Clayton Act
makes it clear that Congress was concerned that merger law not applied too harshly to the
acquisition of properly defined 'failing' firms."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 551 ("The
legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendments to § 7 makes clear that Congress
intended some kind of exemption for acquisitions of 'failing' companies.").
60. The defense "underwent no significant judicial development or clarification dur-
ing the interim between International Shoe and the 1950 Clayton Act amendments."
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had Congress explicitly established the defense with a clearly de-
fined purpose, application, and consequence. But the question is
different where, as here, the statutory language provided no indi-
cation of such defense and what the legislators intended depended
on what International Shoe could offer.
The Eighty-first Congress, in passing the Celler-Kefauver Act,6 '
made two amendments to federal merger law. It made Section 7
applicable to asset sales in addition to stock transactions. It also
redefined the statutory test to prohibit a merger where "in any line
of commerce... in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly."
62
Before rushing to the Congressional reports to explore the legis-
lative intent, a serious challenge can be raised: is the legislative
history permissible to interpret the meaning of a statute where, as
here, the text is clear and unambiguous? Not all commentators
turn a blind eye to this apparent conflict. Connor chose to raise
the point sotto voce in a footnote,2 which is both understandable
and regrettable. Areeda was more constructive, concluding that, "if
the failing firm defense is to be justified strictly by the statutory
language, it must rest on the ground that the acquisition of a fail-
ing firm does not threaten to 'lessen competition' in the same way
that a merger of a thriving firm might."' In other words, there
would be no affirmative defense. This finding is exactly right. Had
Areeda taken it one step further in his influential treatise, then
perhaps a bad doctrine would have been gone long ago. Areeda
intimated that the defense "would be a different and narrower de-
fense than the one that speaking members of Congress
Laurenza, supra note 13, at 951 (noting Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1943) as
the only case during the period where the per se defense was used).
61. Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, §§ 7, 11, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125-28 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2000)).
62. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Star. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2000)) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
63. Connor, supra note 1, at 98 n.53
The failing-company problem sought to be resolved by reference to the legislative
history of amended section 7 is, in fact, not the product of ambiguity in the statute
but of ambiguity in the legislative history itself. In other words, the legislative history
is not being used to clarify an ambiguous statute but to introduce an inconsistency
into a statute which is, in this one respect at least, clear and unambiguous on its face.
Id. (citing United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (emphasis omitted)).
64. 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, at 244.
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contemplated,, 65 but he failed to be explicit about how it would be
different, explain the difference with the jurisprudential root in
International Shoe, or put forward the conclusion that whatever
came out of the 1950 Congress relying on International Shoe could
not be a per se defense.
What the speaking members of Congress contemplated has been
thoroughly researched. 66 There is no question that the legislators
wanted some better treatment for failing companies. 6 ' There is also
no question that the legislators had International Shoe in mind as
they contemplated.& But it is not clear what their true intent was.
69
The most explicit announcement of an absolute defense could be
found in the question and answer appendix to the House report,
which stated that the Clayton Act would not apply in bankruptcy or
receivership cases.7 0 However, Connor revealed that this passage
was copied verbatim from a document accompanying an earlier
bill in 1947, which would only amend the Clayton Act to include
65. Id.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 81-1191, at 6 (1949); S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 9 (1950).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. At this juncture, this Note wishes to distinguish itself from Professor Bok, who,
based on the same Congressional reports, presumes a constructive legislative intent in favor of
the defense and only questions the rationale for such intent or the lack of explanation or
elaboration thereof. See Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 339-40 (1960).
Nowhere in the debates or committee reports, however, did Congress explain pre-
cisely how a failing company could be defined and identified, whether the defense
should be absolute, or under what conditions alternative or less attractive channels of
sale might have to be used. Nor was Congress at all specific in defining its reasons for
providing such an exception.
Id.
Constructive statutory interpretation often foreshadows the real legislative intent based on
an assumption in favor of the status quo or the prevailing view. This Note considers con-
structive statutory interpretation particularly unhelpful here as the object of interpretation
has no statutory anchor.
70.
Question: "Would the bill prevent a corporation in failing or bankrupt condition
from selling its assets to a competitor?"
Answer: "The argument that a corporation in bankrupt or failing condition might
not be allowed to sell to a competitor has already been disposed of by the courts. It is
well settled that the Clayton Act does not apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases.
In the case of International Shoe Co. v. The Federal Trade Commission ... the Supreme
Court went much further."
H.R. REp. No. 81-1191, at 6 (1949). Almost identical language appeared in the Senate re-
port. S. REp. No. 81-1775, at 9 (1950).
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asset sales and would not change the statutory test,71 and its adop-
tion may well be a product of Congressional inadvertence.
This inadvertence is fatal to any argument favoring the defense's
doctrinal legitimacy that relies on legislative intent. In amending
the statutory test, Congress clearly intended to take the Sherman
Act influence out of Clayton Act practice. " There is no eliding the
illogic of the view that the International Shoe holding could be codi-
fied into a doctrine while the very same legislation negated its
jurisprudential basis-all of which was done without an attempt at
a reconciling explanation. The absence of such explanation could
only be rationally explained by intentional rejection.
It follows that either Congress misread International Shoe and
"codified" a doctrine that the case did not create,4 or based on
some independent reason, it intentionally or unintentionally mis-
cited International Shoe with the practical effect of inserting a for-
eign doctrine into the American antitrust law. If one has to make
an educated guess, in view of Congress's prevailing concern about
whether companies in bankruptcy or receivership would be able to
sell their assets,75 the intuitive appeal and the political popularity of
the "defense" blinded legislators from seeing its full legal implica-
tions. In either case both an impurity and a vacuum were
introduced into the law: what mattered as a matter of doctrine now
was how the high court would mend the conflict and reinvent the
doctrine, if at all, in the amended Clayton Act jurisprudence.
71. H.R. REP. No. 80-596, at 5-6 (1947).
72. Connor, supra note 1, at 98.
73. S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 4 (1950).
The committee believe that the excessive sweep that has been given to section 7 of
the present Clayton Act ... has been largely responsible for the tendency of the
courts in cases under that section to revert to the Sherman Act test. By eliminating
the provisions of the existing section that appear to reach situations of little eco-
nomic significance, it is the purpose of this legislation to assure a broader
construction of the more fundamental provisions that are retained than has been
given in the past. The Committee wish to make clear that the bill is not intended to
revert to the Sherman Act test.
Id.
74. Note the fact that the Act was passed in holiday atmosphere on Dec. 29, 1950. See
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, §§ 7, 11, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125-28 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2000)).
75. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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C. Citizen Publishing and the Warren Court
It was not without hard feelings76 in some quarters that the newly
amended Clayton Act had the misfortune of being hijacked by the
Warren Court in Brown Shoe,77 which, as the first Supreme Court
opinion after the 1950 amendments, became the official interpre-
tation of what the eighty-first Congress intended in its amendment
of the Clayton Act.78 Had Congress benefited from any substantial
development in Brown Shoe, the failing company defense would
have been on a much more solid doctrinal footing, despite its
shaky past.79 But Brown Shoe mentioned the defense only in pass-
ing.80
In the following years, the defense was frequently litigated in
lower courts but upheld only twice without development.81 When
Citizen Publishing2 came before the bench in 1969, the failing com-,com-
pany defense existed in an "amorphous state,"83 which the Warren
Court, for the first time, had a clear chance to end. The case in-
volved the merger between the only two daily newspapers in
Tucson, Arizona-the Star and the Citizen-who had been vigorous
competitors before entering into an expansive joint operating
agreement, which included price fixing, profit pooling, market
control, and an option to an equity merger, which was later exer-
cised8 4 The defendant's only real defense was that Citizen was a
76. Under the austere jurisprudence of Brown Shoe, efficiencies were evidence of
anticompetitive behavior. Chicago School scholars vehemently disagree, arguing that the
rigid structural approach artificially prevent efficiencies from scale economies. See, e.g.,
Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTi-
TRUST L.J. 105 (2002). But some, such as Judge Posner, seem to have agreed with the
structural approach, only contending that the threshold was too low. See Kolasky & Dick,
supra note 17, at 209.
77. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
78. See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKEMP, supra note 30, at 243.
79. For example, one could imagine a fair argument that the defense as repeatedly fol-
lowed by the agencies in their administrative actions merits deference by the courts. See
Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. In two passages, Brown Shoe briefly mentioned a merger between two small com-
panies and a merger between a financially healthy company and a failing one as examples of
"special mergers" Congress recognized, without much elaboration. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at
319-20, 331. In the latter passage, the opinion mentioned International Shoe, again without
meaningful elaboration. Id. at 331. Therefore, Justice Stewart's assertion in General Dynam-
ics that the failing company defense was "adopted" in Brown Shoe was misplaced-not to
mention it was still dictum for that case. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486, 506 (1974).
81. Granader v. Pub. Bank, 281 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Mich. 1967), afT d, 417 F.2d 75 (6th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970); United States v. Md. & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958).
82. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
83. Laurenza, supra note 13, at 955.
84. Citizen Publ'g, 394 U.S. at 133-34.
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failing company, citing heavy financial loss and inability to secure
815advertising avenues.
In a three-paragraph footnote,0 the court laid out what it was
ready to recognize of the failing company defense. In the first, the
court cited three authorities, 7 which, interestingly, were all aca-
demic journal articles and represented not a consensus, but a
debate: Bok took the realist's middle ground of recognizing the
defense but raising many doubts,8 Hale and Hale were generally
supportive, 9 while Connor cast strong critiques. ° More curiously,
no "but see" or "compare" operator was used to separate the cita-
tions. If this omission is not sufficient evidence to establish an
explicit desire for neutrality, it at a minimum does not constitute a
whole-hearted embrace of the defense.
The next two paragraphs intensify the ambiguity. The court
cited two cases where the doctrine "was held to justify mergers.,91
Then, it provided a list of five "cases where the failing company
doctrine was not allowed as a defense."92 Whether this discussion
means the court agreed with the latter cases in rejecting the de-
fense, or only rejected the specific claim before it while approving
the doctrine itself can only be ascertained, if at all, upon examin-
ing these cases. In Diebold,13 the court in a short per curiam
decision reversed a summary judgment upholding the merger be-
cause there was genuine dispute of fact whether alternative
purchase offers were really made. In El Paso Gas,9 4 the court
85. Id. at 133 (Citizen's annual losses averaged about $23,550 and Star sold fifty per-
cent more advertising space than Citizen).
86. Id. at 137 n.2.
87. Id.
88. Bok, supra note 69, at 339-47.
89. G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the Antitrust
Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597, 607 (1964).
90. Connor, supra note 1.
91. Citizen Publ'g, 394 U.S. at 137 n.2 (citing United States v. Md. & Va. Milk Produc-
ers Ass'n, 167 F Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd in part, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960)).
92. Citizen Publ'g, 394 U.S. at 137 n.2.
93. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam).
94. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). In furthering its rea-
soning rejecting the merger, the court first observed Pacific Northwest's great proximity to
the California market. Id. at 661. It continued to explain:
Pacific Northwest was no feeble, failing company; nor was it inexperienced and lacking
in resourcefulness. It was one of two major interstate pipelines serving the trans-Rocky
Mountain States; it had raised $250 million for its pipeline that extended 2,500 miles
through rugged terrain. It had adequate reserves and managerial skill. It was so
strong and militant that it was viewed with concern, and coveted, by El Paso. If El
Paso can absorb Pacific Northwest without violating § 7 of the Clayton Act, that sec-
tion has no meaning in the natural gas field.
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seemed unaware of any doctrine to speak of, using the term "fail-
ing" together with "feeble" in a casual way. In Von's Grocery, where
the majority famously prohibited a merger between two Los Ange-
les area groceries that would have a combined market share of a
meager 7.5%, the acquired company, Shopping Bag, was nowhere
near failing financial trouble.95 Next, interestingly, the attention
was specifically directed to a footnote in the seminal case of Phila-
delphia National Bank, which turned out to be the last footnote of
the majority opinion and pure dictum.96 The last cited case, Third
National Bank, was a substantive continuation of the Philadelphia
National Bank dictum, finding that, although Congress intended
banks to qualify easier as failing firms to merge despite substantial
anticompetitive effects, the merging banks in question were still
not weak enough to qualify.97 Read together, these cases betrayed
no unified pattern, and the court in so citing demonstrated no
clear purpose. The Citizen Publishing court seemed intent on re-
maining a neutral raconteur without getting itself involved in
substantive ruling on the failing company defense.
The immediate following footnote in Citizen Publishing elevated
and confirmed this attitude. The Court noted that although the
Celler-Kefauver Act amendments to the statutory test might affect
the defense, "[w]e have no occasion, however, to determine what
changes, if any, that amendment had on the failing company doc-
Id. at 661-62.
95. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 280, 293, 297 (1966). Both the
concurrence by Justice White and the scathing dissent by Justice Stewart seemed to assume
viability of the failing company defense, but without elaboration or apparent relevance to
their arguments. Id. at 280-304.
96. In Philadelphia National Bank the court noted: "Section 7 ... does not exclude de-
fenses based on dangers to liquidity or solvency, if to avert them a merger is necessary."
United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963). In the footnote, the court
speculated that the contours for failing company defense in the banking industry would be
"somewhat larger." Id. at 372 n.46.
97. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 187 (1968).
Congress seems to have felt that a bank failure is a much greater community catas-
trophe than the failure of an industrial or retail enterprise, and that a much smaller
risk of failure than that required by the failing company doctrine should be sufficient
to justify the rather radical preventive step of an anticompetitive merger.
Id.
It is important to note that then bank merger cases were also governed by the Bank
Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Star. 7, 7-10 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1965
& Supp. II), which required that "bank mergers first be subject to the usual antitrust analy-
sis; if a merger fails that scrutiny, it would be permissible only if the merging banks can
establish that the merger's benefits to the community would outweigh its anticompetitive
disadvantages." Id. This Note appreciates this rationale in its proposal. See infra Part [V.A.
760 [VOL. 41:3
The Failing Company Defense
trine."8 Despite such apparent evasiveness, the Warren Court held
fast to jurisprudence principles. Effectively, the Warren Court
made at least two important observations: that the 1950 amend-
ments could not have created and did not create any new defense
outside the International Shoe precedent; and that it had no desire
to rule on the defense. The court was content simply to confine the
defense "to its present narrow scope. ''
The Warren Court's ambivalence is best understood as recon-
ciliation between its sympathy for small social units and its ideal of
using government power to achieve social progress,'9 which, in the
area of antitrust, was difficult to implement because the dissolution
of excessive corporate power rarely came without social casualties.
In essence, the Warren Court expressed lukewarm interest in the
failing company defense to endorse the government's judgment in
the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.'0 ' Justice Stewart, after
all, may have had a point. 
2
Post Citizen Publishing, the Supreme Court would not further de-
velop the failing company defense.' 3 From the perspective of
doctrinal development, Citizen Publishing did not leave us with any
more clarity than we had when the case arrived at the Court. This
was a disappointing finish. As merger review under the Guidelines
came of age, the agencies were left with no clear judicial vector
guiding its only affirmative defense. °4 The resulting problems were
all but inevitable.
98. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 n.3 (1969).
99. Id. at 139. But see Correia, supra note 43, at 685-86 (arguing that as a result of Citi-
zen Publishing there now was a judicially recognized, albeit narrow, defense in addition to.
strong legislative history). Professor Fox holds the interesting view that "[w]e have a failing
firm defense as a matter of Supreme Court case law (Citizen Publishing)," but at the same
time such "Citizen Publishing defense is an anomaly." Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitive-
ness, and the World Arena: Efficiencies and Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725,
732 (1996).
100. SeeG. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 279 (1982) ("The theoretical
dimension of Warren's opinions ... was largely ethical in nature. He tended to approach
cases not from the perspective of political or social theory, but rather with an interest in
achieving a fair and humane outcome in a given case.").
101. This view is corroborated by Justices Warren's voting record. See Kauper, supra note
6, at 532.
102. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) ("The sole consis-
tency.., is that.., the government always wins.") (StewartJ, dissenting).
103. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; infta text accompanying notes 117-121.
104. The failing division defense is the other affirmative defense, with more strict re-
quirements. But since the failing division defense shares the same ideological root with the
failing company defense, for the sake of convenience, this Note does not treat it separately.
SeeGUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 5.2.
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II. THE FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE
A. Merger Review under the Guidelines
The pre-merger filing requirement of the HSR Act of 1976'05 re-
shaped contemporary federal merger control practice. Under the
HSR Act, if the transaction in question exceeds a certain threshold,
the merging parties must notify the agencies prior to the consum-
mation and submit such transaction to an automatic thirty-day wait
period.Y06 It is during such period that one of the agencies conducts
its review, which, at the agency's election, can be prolonged by the
issuance of a second request. 0 7 In the end, the agency either clears
the deal or chooses to challenge the deal, usually by filing for a
preliminary injunction in federal court.'8
Hence, merger review occurs in two fora-either within the
agencies or in federal courts. 1'9 The workings are different, but the
government's substantive review remains the same. Under the
Guidelines, such review follows a five-part routine: market defini-
tion and concentration; potential adverse competitive effects; entry
analysis; efficiencies; and failing and exiting assets."0 If the matter
goes to litigation, the government has the first burden of produc-
tion. Such proof is usually based on structural statistics that focus
upon established market boundaries. Once the government has
met its burden and made its prima facie case, the burden is on the
defendant to rebut it. Under the current jurisprudence, one must
look beyond the statistics and examine the "structure, history and
probable future" of the market,"' which introduces the parties to a
balancing test with adverse competitive effects on the one hand
and the ease of entry and efficiencies on the other.
105. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
107. Id. § 18a(a)-(b).
108. Id. § 18a(f).
109. SeeGUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 0.
110. GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 0.2.
111. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962)).
Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the industry leaders and
the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary index of market power; but only
a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history and probable
future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive
effect of the merger.
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The failing company defense requires a relatively separate in-
quiry. The test has been articulated in various forms by different
courts, but in essence two prongs must be satisfied. First, the failing
firm must suffer some serious financial distress (the "financial dis-
tress prong"), either having a "grave probability of business failure"
under International Shoe or being unable to survive bankruptcy per
Justice Douglas in Citizen Publishing.'2 Second, the firm must have
in good faith searched for a less anticompetitive alternative pur-
chaser, which must have failed (the "alternative purchaser
prong")." 3 The agencies' Guidelines include a four-prong test for
the failing firm, which is facially more stringent than case law." 4 To
pass muster under the Guidelines test, the firm must be both insol-
vent in the near future and unable to successfully reorganize under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act." 5 The firm still needs to have
made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative
offers of asset acquisition that would have kept the assets in the
market and would have been less anticompetitive than the pro-
posed merger."" Additionally, the firm must show that absent the
merger the assets in question will exit the market."
7
The fact that the failing company defense is listed at the bottom
of the Guidelines' five-part analytical structure by no means sug-
gests that it comes into consideration only after the first four parts
are completed and generate no definitive answer. The agencies
have clarified in the Commentary that the ordering is not itself
analytically significant, because they do not apply the Guidelines as
a linear, step-by-step progression but as an integrated operation.""
In fact, when one of the merging parties is financially weak to some
degree, the defense often plays an early role; when the merger
otherwise does not have a good case against antitrust scrutiny, the
defense becomes the central concern. This outcome has been true
in recent merger cases across various industries."9
112. SeeGUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 5.1.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74.
116. See GUIDELINES, supranote 19, § 5.].
117. Id.
118. SeeCOMMENTARY, supra note 21, at2.
119. See, e.g., Whiteman, supra note 11 (discussing the airline industry);Jaret Seiberg,
Aid May Short-Circuit Airline Mergers, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 23, 2001 (discussing the prospect that
post-September 11 federal aid package to the airlines, which keeps the carriers out of bank-
ruptcy, may preempt the failing company defense and prevent airline mergers); Jaret
Seiberg, No Exit: "Failing Firm" Offers No Reprieve for UAL and Incoming Senate Banking Commit-
tee Head Richard Shelby Vows to Continue the Fight Against Corporate Fraud, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 13,
2002 (discussing the bankrupt UAL Corp.'s chance of merging with another airline) (air-
lines); Hurry-up Offense to Halt GE Acquisition of FAN, FFC: WATCH, Mar. 25, 1991, at 5
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B. Practical Confusions
The distinct characteristic of the failing company defense in re-
cent times has been both an increase in usage and an increase in
the mutations of its basic form,120 largely aimed at some relaxation
of the financial distress prong. Jurisprudentially, this trend was in-
tertwined with General Dynamics,2' the leading decision from the
first year of the Burger Court.
General Dynamics approved a prima facie illegal merger between
two coal operators, because the court thought the reserves of the
parties were depleting, therefore current Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index figures could not correctly reflect the competitive picture for
the future. The court went to painful (and in this respect unhelp-
ful) '2 2 details to distinguish its holding from the failing company
defense,' 23 and one commentator agreed that the two approaches
(financial data and media); DOJ OKs Hearst Buy of Failing Houston Competitor, FTC: WATCH,
Apr. 24, 1995, at 10 (reporting on the Antitrust Division's clearing of the merger between
Houston Post and Houston Chronicle); Reno Approves Denver Newspapers'JOA, Rocky Mountain
News "Failing,"FTC: WATc,Jan. 15, 2001, at 14 (reporting on the Antitrust Division's clear-
ing of the merger between the Rocky Mountain News and the Denver Post) (newspaper);
Carry Piggott & Jaret Seiberg, Aholds Supermarket Sweep Could Trip Antitrust Rules, DAILY
DEAL, Nov. 28, 2000 (analyzing the Dutch grocer's purchase of fifty-six stores from the bank-
rupt Grand Union store chain) (retail);J. Mark Gidley & David A. Balto, Leveling the Playing
Field in Antitrust Merger Litigation: The SunGuard Decision, THE M&A LAWYER, Jan. 2002, at 16
(discussing how the acquisition of Comdisco by SunCard Data Systems could not benefit
from the failing company defense because of a competing bid from Hewlett-Packard) (soft-
ware); KohI/DeWine to FCC: Bell Co./WorldCom Merger Would Be A Step Backwards, FTC: WATCH,
Jul. 22, 2002, at 5 (reporting on the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee chairmen's opposition
to relaxing the failing company defense to allow a merger of a Baby Bell company and
WorldCom) (telecommunications); FTC Drops Other Shoe As Federal Judge Slams Failing Com-
pany Defense, FTC: WATCH, Dec. 3, 1990, at 10 (the Meade Celestron joint venture under
failing company defense did not "pass muster"). Note that special federal statutes apply in
the banking, newspaper, and telecommunication industries to preempt federal antitrust
laws. See infra Part W.A. Remarkably, the Houston Chronicle-Houston Post merger was
cleared by the Department on the failing company ground. DOJ OKs Hearst Buy of Failing
Houston Competitor, FIC: WATCH, Apr. 24, 1995, at 10.
120. Arquit, supra note 7.
121. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,498 (1974).
122. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
123. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 508.
The appellees' demonstration of United's weak reserves position, however, proved an
entirely different point. Rather than showing that United would have gone out of
business but for the merger with Material Service, the finding of inadequate reserves
went to the heart of the Government's statistical prima facie case based on produc-
tion figures and substantiated the District Court's conclusion that United Electric,
even if it remained in the market, did not have sufficient reserves to compete effec-
tively for long-term contracts. The failing-company defense is simply inapposite to
this finding and the failure of the appellees to meet the prerequisites of that doctrine
did not detract from the validity of the court's analysis.
[VOL. 41:3
The Failing Company Defense
differed significantly.14 However, the distinction between a General
Dynamics "flailing firm" and a Citizen Publishing failing firm is not
factually intuitive, if legally intelligible. Weakness is in any event a
welcome factor for the defense, and the bar has pursued it vigor-
ously.
The development culminated into remarkable success in Interna-
tional Harvester,25 where the Seventh Circuit approved an otherwise
illegal merger because one party had difficulty obtaining financing.
International Harvester has been criticized for its lack of discipline
and on a later occasion, the circuit court had to clarify that it did
not wish to create a per se "weak firm defense." 2" However, the im-
pact of International Harvester is broad and lasting. The courts
endeavor to tighten the jurisprudence by narrowing General Dynam-
ics, requiring that evidence of financial weakness genuinely
undercut the statistical prima facie case.' 27 But on the failing firm
side, little clarification is made, as the courts disagree over the
agencies' stringent requirement of not surviving bankruptcy reor-
ganization as a necessary condition for the failing firm. Arch Coal,'
2
8
a recent case closely watched by the industry, provides a prime ex-
ample of the entrenching confusion, as the District of Columbia
District Court completely mixed up the two theories, 12" while the




124. See generally Roger B. Kaplan, Note, All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: The
Failing Company Doctrine as a Conditional Defense to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 643 (1976).
125. United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
126. The Seventh Circuit attempted to limit its earlier International Harvester ruling by
explaining that financial weakness was only "one relevant economic factor among many"
that the court considered and adopted in a General Dynamics inquiry. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 652 F.2d 1324, 1339 (7th Cir. 1981). The
court then laudably chastised its license in International Harvester.
Financial weakness, while perhaps relevant in some cases, is probably the weakest
ground of all forjustifying a merger. The acquisition of a financially weak company in
effect hands over its customers to the financially strong, thereby deterring competi-
tion by preventing others from acquiring those customers, making entry into the
market more difficult. Moreover, a weak company defense would extend the failing
company doctrine, a defense which the Supreme Court in General Dynamics observed
has strict limits.
Id.
127. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991);
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
128. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
129. See id. at 153 ("A 'failing' or even 'flailing' company defense has evolved from the
Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics.").
130. Id. (citing FTC's post-hearing brief).
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Problems with the other prong of the defense-the alternative
purchaser requirement-are less dogmatic than mechanical, en-
gendering more suits but less remarkable litigation.13 ' Two
categories of questions are contested. First, how much effort to
seek an alternative purchaser is enough? This requirement often
creates difficult managerial problems for the merging parties and
evidentiary problems for the adjudicators. There is a thin line be-
tween fulfilling one's fiduciary duty in protecting the value of the
business concern and soliciting wider offers, particularly from out-
side the industry. Moreover, merger planning is often a time-
consuming matter, and the late appearance of a "more competi-
tive" suitor can be dramatically disruptive. Second and relatedly,
what price must the company accept? In the face of competing of-
fers, should the firm be forced to be sold to the less
anticompetitive buyer even if the offer is extremely low? The fail-
ing firm should not benefit from the failing status by being allowed
to auction for the highest bidder, and that any price above liquida-
tion value is permissible. But the field is still largely under-defined
by court decisions.
3 2
C. The Cause and the Cost
To be fair, the failing company defense did not by itself cause all
the confusion. The General Dynamics jurisprudence superposed an
anomalous proposition that a weak firm would be better off than a
failing one, if the agencies' strict failing-company test is to be faith-
fully applied. But at the core, it is the lack of solid independent
doctrinal footing of the failing company defense that makes it hard
to distinguish the failing company defense from General Dynamics.
The doctrinal deficiency also injects inherent logical flaws in
each of the two prongs of the test. If the rationale is to prevent as-
sets from leaving the market, why deny the benefit to less failing
firms? After all, from an economic point of view, there is no real
difference between exiting assets and under-utilized assets in less
profitable but still viable firms. If the "stockholders and communi-
ties" in International Shoe truly merit concern, why force the firm to
accept offers that may be substantially lower? All things considered,
wouldn't a sliding scale make more sense? The courts have no an-
131. Arquit, supra note 7.
132. Id. at 2-3. Note that there could also be potential conflict with state corporate law.
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(holding that once a Delaware corporation is up for sale, the directors have a fiduciary duty
to search for the highest bidder).
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swer because they cannot find a convincing and consistent ration-
ale from the long-standing doctrine. The agencies have no answer
either because the rigid nature of the per se defense allows them
little prosecutorial discretion to fashion unilateral, more sensible
approaches to failing firm claims.
The major cost of this confusion is not the loss of consumer wel-
fare from glaring examples of mistake, i.e., mega mergers that
unjustly escaped antitrust regulation on the failing firm band-
wagon and struck back by harming consumers. The defense, after
all, is rigorously applied and does not appear harmful. 13  The real
toll is on prosecutorial-judicial economy as enforcers seek to con-
strain strategic behavior and the incremental encroachment of
anticompetitive mergers, which occur in connection with border-
line failing firm claims, or where prosecution could be more
effective with more resources. Theoretically, it may happen that the
defense benefits some bona fide failing firms, but in reality, be-
cause life and death are not clearly distinguishable events in the
business world, evidence is highly malleable and within the control
of the management, and there is no reward for appearing strong-
strategic behavior is inevitable. Such behavior is particularly hard
to distinguish during periods of economic downturn, when waves
of bankruptcies are filed, or in certain industries, such as high
technology, where the balance sheet says little of the true business
strength. Mr. Baker 34 provided a seasoned, if cynical, view of how
the defense had been abused. Indeed, "few truly failing companies
can afford the delays of fully litigating the issue." 35 The doctrine
can only benefit players with deep pockets and large interests to
get leverage in their bargains with the administrative agencies.
1II. RETHINKING THE FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE
The preceding Parts illustrate the failing company defense's his-
torical doctrinal deficiencies and (quite consequently) current
133. Fox, supra note 99, at 732.
134. Baker's playbook includes such strategies for the seller: (a) hire a good economist
to make a persuasive argument for a larger market to contest the government's prima facie
case; (b) pay heed to internal documents which the government is likely to acquire in the
HSR process, particularly the overly optimistic business plans; (c) hire a good investment
banker to make an alternative purchaser search that the government is likely to find persua-
sive; (d) keep track of and follow up on "all the nibbles"; (e) be open to accept an early out-
of-market offer ("don't wait till the last minute and have your top choice blocked by anti-
trust agencies"); (f) when failure is real, consider declaring bankruptcy. Donald L Baker: How
to Play the Failing Company Merger Game with the Bureaucrats in Washington, FTC: WATCH, Oct.
21, 1991, at 13-15.
135. Id.
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practical problems. It does not follow, however, that such facts
alone require that the defense must go. Mr. Baxter's unflattering
comment that "[the defense] has become acceptable to all of us
only by virtue of constant repetition and the passage of time,"
36
which contains a lot of truth, harbors its own counterargument.
Time heals many wounds, and tradition is a formidable force in
law. Even seeing the misgivings of the defense, a plausible argu-
ment can still be made that it should nonetheless be "acceptable"
because it is normatively desirable, in which case the practical diffi-
culties surveyed in Part II, without more, would be goals of reform
instead of cases for removal, and the legal deficit established in
Part I could, indeed should, be repaired in exchange for the doc-
trine's longevity and good health, not demise. A normative inquiry
of the defense is, therefore, in order.
A. Theoretical Reconstruction
Why is change better than the status quo? Why is one proposal
of change superior to another? In order for any normative com-
parison to achieve meaning, one must first establish a value
standard. Competition, of course, has always been the pronounced
aim of antitrust law.137 But competition itself cannot be the appro-
priate standard, not because it is hard to measure, which it is, but
because it is not a pure concept.3 Competition must be decon-
structed into more basic values, which in this case results in an
equity standard and an efficiency standard.'39
136. Baxter, supra note 9, at 248.
137. No matter the prevailing ideological climate, the text of Section 7 requires that
competition, however defined, remain the law's ultimate concern, however interpreted. See
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) ("may be substantially to lessen competition").
138. Professor Friedman, in his thoughtful analysis, was fully aware of the shortcomings
of using "competitiveness" indiscriminately and of the necessity of finding a pure value an-
chor. Professor Friedman used efficiency as the one and only proxy for competitiveness,
citing the ideological climate, but he did not, however, seem to appreciate that there was an
equity component to the competition goal. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1384-85.
What 'anticompetitive' means, and how competitiveness is measured, are not at all
clear. Most often these concepts are used as if they are self-explanatory. But of course
they are not. . . . The view that economic efficiency is the sole aim of antitrust laws is
now academically ascendant and has greatly influenced recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court.
Id. (citations omitted).
139. The efficiency aspect may be easier to understand as more competition creates
more efficiencies--allocative, productive, or dynamic. For an excellent summary of the
taxonomy of efficiencies, see Kolasky & Dick, supra note 17, at 242-51. The equitable aspect,
less obvious, is rooted in the two traditional concerns of antitrust law---consumer welfare
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The consumer equity standard cannot help the failing company
defense, which by definition tolerates a post-merger market with
prima facie undue market power. It therefore cannot ipso facto be
deemed inequitable in all cases. 4 0 But what about equity for other
constituencies? The term may not readily belong to the antitrust
law lexicon, but if one recalls the "hardship rationale" in Interna-
tional Shoe and the prevalent use of equitable relief in this area, it
may seem inviting to argue that some loosely-defined "social eq-
uity" concerns are not only permissible in merger review, but
desirable. 14 Indeed, social goals are traditionally accepted in sub-
stantive laws such as corporate law14 or financial regulations.4
There is no a priori reason why social goals are not permissible as
one parameter in antitrust.4 4 This Note takes the position that social
equity concerns can be considered only in exceptional cases.1
45
and small business. First, the more competitive the market, the closer the price to the mar-
ginal cost and the more even how much consumers pay for the product to how much the
producer pays. Id. Second and arguably, the more competitive the market, the more equal
access to consumers small businesses are able to enjoy. Id. Together, the market may be
called more "fair."
140. Note that the defense may well leave the market with less market power than there
would otherwise be, i.e., with the assets in question exiting the market. When this result
occurs, there is less efficiency loss and therefore net efficiency (allocative) gain. This Note
considers this point in an integrated efficiencies critique, infra IILB.
141. One difficulty with this proposition could be the danger of a logical trap that fair-
ness, an endogenous element in law, is used to measure the progress of the failing company
defense, which would be either circular or arbitrary. This difficulty may be one reason why
Chicago School scholars consider efficiency the sole goal of antitrust laws. See generally
Robert H. Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (2d ed. 1993).
142. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk S Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1759, 1769 (2006) ("Most
U.S. states permit corporate directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than
stockholders." (quoting Mark J. Roe, Delawares Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2525-26
(2005)) ("Even Delaware law has long made clear that directors have wide leeway to pursue
the course of action") (citing Paramount Commc'ns., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989))).
143. Howell E. Jackson, An American Perspective on the U.K. Financial Services Authority:
Politics, Goals & Regulatory Intensity 16 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 522, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-
center/papers/pdf/Jackson_522.pdf (discussing redistributive policies and other equitable
norms as the less well publicized objectives of financial regulations in the United States) ("A
good example of this phenomenon is the Community Reinvestment Act for depository insti-
tutions, but analogs also exist in the insurance industry and, to a limited extent, the
securities field.").
144. Professor Fox may have meant a similar point when she argued that "[the failing
firm defense] case law may seem of questionable wisdom to those who believe that the job of
antitrust is antitrust." Fox, supra note 99, at 732.
145. Because this Note believes that antitrust law differs from substantive economic laws
in that antitrust law sets the basic rules rather than refereeing specific plays, it is preferable
to maintain a lean, Constitution-like structure rather than keeping a claims department for
reconciling broad-ranging constituency interests.
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Efficiencies, on the other hand, are no light topic in antitrust
law.4' Fortunately, the sufficiency, let alone supremacy, of efficien-
cies need not be decided here. The only pertinent question at this
juncture is: is it permissible to use efficiencies as a factor to estab-
lish the normative desirability of a faulty legal doctrine? Given
today's jurisprudence, the answer is affirmative.
47
It follows that if the failing company defense were to have suffi-
cient normative merit to overcome its doctrinal deficiency, it can
only be based on an efficiencies argument.
B. The Efficiencies of the Defense
The naive belief that exiting assets pose no efficiency impact has
been long discredited as bad economics. 1 4 In most cases, one
firm's failing reduces aggregate economic welfare. 49 It does not
follow, obviously, that all failing firms ought to be salvaged at all
costs. It is imperative to consider the net balance of efficiencies,
i.e., those gained through assets staying in the market less those
lost from competitive harm. 50 Early empirical analysis focused on
146. The ideological war over the role of efficiencies has been the most important
theme of the antitrust law. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Drafts-
man's View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618, 621 (1983) (arguing that non-efficiency goals are hard to
quantify, subjective, and, alas, inefficient). For an energizing counterargument, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985).
147. The relevance of economic efficiency to antitrust analysis is now agreed on by all
schools of antitrust thinking. See, e.g.,Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint
Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (1996).
148. See Richard M. Dooley, Failing Company Doctrine: Recent Developments, 47 TEX. L. REv.
1437, 1439 (1969); Richard E. Low, The Failing Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 425, 428 (1967); Philip Sotiroff, Com-
ment, An Updating of the "Failing Company" Doctrine in the Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MICH.
L. REv. 566, 577 (1963).
149. In a fine analysis, Professor Campbell corrected Judges Posner and Easterbrook's
view that the market output would stay constant and the failing firm's share would be shared
pro rata by surviving firms. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 261-62 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER
& FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS
471 (2d ed. 1981)). Such scenario can happen only when the marginal cost curves for all
remaining firms are horizontal, so that the remaining firms will increase output to keep the
market level constant. See id. Otherwise only a higher price can lure remaining firms to in-
crease output, in which event demand will be driven lower, and some surplus will be lost at
equilibrium. See id.
150. Sheldon Kimmel raised the fine point that in calculating such efficiencies one
should consider the total welfare of consumers, shareholders, and society as a whole. See
Sheldon Kimmel, The Supreme Courts Efficiency Defense, 12 S. CT. ECON. REv. 209, 211-12
(2004) (promoting a Williamsonian efficiencies defense trade-off). Through this lens the
entire line of cases from International Shoe to General Dynamics can be unified under one
efficiencies defense. While analytically consistent, this Note considers such a universal effi-
ciencies defense ahead of its time and unhelpful for its inquiry.
[VOL. 41:3
The Failing Company Defense
finding such efficiencies to make the defense make sense. Profes-
sor Campbell's cautious study demonstrated that the defense is
economically sound in many but not all cases. He then ques-
tioned the absolute defense in favor of a case-by-case
measurement. 52 This view is now widely shared by commentators
advocating a liberalization of the defense, seeking flexibility in
both prongs of the test. A sliding scale approach in lieu of the
Guidelines' bright lines is suggested as a better means of assessing
the likelihood of business failure.5 3 The wisdom of the alternative
purchaser requirement is also challenged by the argument that an
acquisition by a closer competitor is likely to generate more effi-
ciencies.1
4
This sentiment is at least correct on one point, which is crucial:
the complacency in the status quo is misplaced. Bearing in mind
the mission of this normative inquiry, it is not sufficient that the
defense be efficient from time to time, in some cases but not in
others. It is necessary that the defense be efficient to justify its exis-
tence in at least most cases, if not always. As surveyed,'B5 the
inherent conflicts of the defense determine that this result cannot
be the case. The failing company defense, as is, promises no consis-
tent efficiencies. An almost failing firm might benefit from
efficiencies from a merger while a 100% failing firm might not. An
acquisition by a dominant rival firm may generate efficiencies
while that by a weak non-rival might not.
Now that reform is due, the question becomes: in which direc-
tion? Should the defense simply be abolished? Or should the
defense be relaxed so that its satisfaction is contingent upon effi-
ciencies being realized more often? The key to the answer is what
efficiencies one may consider. Not just any efficiency may be al-
lowed to justify the defense for jurisprudential reasons. The Brown
Shoe court could not have thrown efficiencies out of the front door,
yet rolled out a welcome mat at the back door. Even today, when
efficiencies are routinely considered in merger review, the agencies
are very careful and strict about what kind of efficiencies they ad-
mit, an effort that would be largely frustrated if "failing firms" were
to enjoy an absolute exemption. Under the Guidelines and the
151. This finding may have been all but inevitable given the strong conditions imposed
on data. In the end, the sample only consisted of data from four cases. Campbell, supra note
18, at 267-68.
152. Id. at 269-70.
153. See, e.g., Failing Firms and Industries, FTC: WATCH, Nov. 22, 1995, at 5-6 (quoting at-
torney Molly Boast).
154. See e.g. Correia, supra note 43, at 693-95.
155. See supra Parts IL.B-C.
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Commentary, efficiencies are considered only if they are merger-
specific and cognizable. 56 The exact same eligibility requirements
must be in place for the failing firm efficiencies probe.
Once under the Guidelines efficiencies paradigm, mergers with
a failing firm may in fact present clearer analytical cases. First, the
alternative prospect of the assets exiting the market may serve as a
convincing argument that the projected efficiencies are merger-
specific, against the presumptive regulatory suspicion that the
same efficiencies could always be achieved through internal expan-
sion.157 Second, such efficiencies may be more cognizable. A
company's failing finances often have little bearing on its competi-
tive position. The fact that a firm with market power offers to buy it
is the most solid and reliable evidence that its assets are in certain
ways useful. Those assets may be key intellectual properties such as
brands or patents, or other intangible assets such as the distribu-
tion network or locations, or simply capacity. Such assets can only
be used in two ways, either competitively, producing efficiencies, 58
or anticompetitively, generating coordinated or unilateral effects. 9
When a firm is under the pressure of creditors and the capital
markets, its more attractive assets are often more conspicuous, and
the true motive and probable effects of the merger are often
harder to disguise.
It follows that liberalization is, indeed, a plausible plan to give
the failing company defense the efficiency legitimacy it needs. The
problem with liberalization is, however, that only a "perfect" one
can suffice. It is not enough to lower the requisite level of the
probability of failing; there must be a complete sliding scale. It is
not enough to allow more leeway to find a non-least-
anticompetitive-alternative purchaser; there must be complete
freedom to choose the highest efficiency-creating suitor. The rea-
sons are two. Doctrinally, only a perfect liberalization can provide a
constant efficiencies justification for the defense. Practically, since
the incentives for strategic behavior are inversely correlated with
156. See GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 4; Commentary, supra note 21, at 49-59.
157. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 99, at 731 ("Firms almost always can achieve all available
economies of scale and scope without making anticompetitive mergers. This is particularly
so in the global marketplace, where competition by effective foreign firms may destroy the
possibility of the domestic firms' power.").
158. Kimmel has proven if the acquired assets don't generate efficiencies, the merger
would not have been necessary to keep the assets in the market. Kimmel, supra note 150, at
214-21. When this situation occurs, it can be good evidence that the merger was done for
no competitive reason, or to no competitive effect, or often both. Id.
159. The adverse competitive effects of acquiring a failing firm are not particularly dif-
ferent from those of any merger. The strengthened market power could be used to raise
prices unilaterally, or fashion more effective oligopolistic behaviors in a coordinated fashion.
See GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 2; Commentary, supra note 21, at 17-36.
[VOL. 41:3
The Failing Company Defense
the conditions imposed on the defense, only a perfect liberaliza-
tion can reduce such behavior to the normal level.
60
Finally, even if such a perfect liberalization were practically fea-
sible, which is unlikely, it would no longer be necessary. The review
necessary to satisfy the defense's conditions and trigger its conse-
quence would in effect become an integrated subset of the
efficiencies review. For all practical purposes, the defense would
cease to exist. It would make no sense to hold on to an anachronis-
tic name.
IV. MERGER REVIEW WITHOUT THE FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE
The case for exorcising the failing company defense from fed-
eral merger review is already evident. This Note proposes a three-
part approach to mergers concerning failing companies. First,
there would be no per se defense for the failing status. Second,
there would be a pointed awareness toward exiting assets within
the current framework of efficiencies analysis. Third, Congress
would adopt ad hoc exemption statutes to further social goals it
desires to address.' 6'
A. Minimum Adjustments
The most important feature of this proposal is that it requires
minimum adjustments in current law and practice. The most per-
ceivable consequence is that the merger review structure will now
have only four components. However, the routine won't change.
The agencies will still first define the market, calculate the concen-
tration, and make the prima facie case. Then, as usual, the
160. To illustrate, suppose a proposed merger that can be cleared in two ways: the nor-
mal review process where the defense need to overcome x amount of difficulties, which
would include establishing a broader market definition, easier entry, more efficiencies, etc.;
and the "defense review" process, which requires y amount of difficulties to establish. Re-
sources will be devoted in pursuing both ways. But as long as x > y, more resources will be
diverted from the normal review to the defense review. As the defense review becomes
broader, which means more conditionalities, y increases, and only when x = y will the divert-
ing flow of resources stop.
161. This Note aims at an intellectual reconstruction, and the implementation of the
proposal is not a major concern. Briefly, the difficulty in effecting the change by the agen-
cies in the GUIDELINES is that the agencies may be reluctant to change unless there is some
reassurance that the inclusion will not work against them in court. The easiest implementa-
tion, theoretically, is for the Supreme Court to explicitly reject the defense. But this scenario
is impractical because the opportunity for a perfect case to emerge is slim. Therefore, an act
of Congress by the recommendation of the agencies seems the most sensible approach.
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government and the defense will debate over the anticompetitive
impact, the ease of entry, and efficiencies. It is only the efficiencies
section that will require some more nuanced adjustments.
The extreme cases would be easy. If the defense can prove no ef-
ficiency and relies solely on the contention that assets would
otherwise exit the market, the merger should be enjoined. On the
other hand, if the agencies are satisfied that the merger would
generate cognizable efficiencies not available via other means,
other things being equal, the merger should be cleared. The diffi-
cult case would be, of course, the one in which the parties project
certain substantial efficiencies, e.g., cost synergies, which fail to
convince the agencies as being merger-specific or cognizable.
Here, the agencies will exercise their discretion, based on the total-
ity of evidence they possess. The degree of financial distress and
the availability of alternative purchasers will be of high evidentiary
value at this point, as they will often reliably corroborate the
strength of the projected efficiencies figures. But these factors will
no longer lead to a dispositive outcome.
The agencies will be familiar with such discretion and welcome
it. It is, after all, just about all the agencies really do in a merger
review. Antitrust is a fact-intensive discipline; the analysis of any
particular merger or even any particular industry can always be
translated into a general rule. 62 The agencies routinely use discre-
tionary general assumptions along industry lines6 3 and use further
discretion to accommodate particularities of individual cases. Not
at all coincidentally, the use of such sector-based discretion has
been particularly pronounced in industries most cited for more
flexibility in applying the failing company defense, 164 such as health
care and defense.65
162. Joe Sims, A New Approach to the Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 633,
635 (1996).
163. SeeJoseph Kattan, The Role of Efficiency Considerations in the Federal Trade Commission's
Antitrust Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 614 (1996)
In industries in which scale economies are significant, the agencies have routinely,
and quite correctly, adjusted the numerical presumptions of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines to accommodate the scale of enterprise needed to attain efficien[cy] ...
whether that scale is based on research and development efficiencies, production ef-
ficiencies, or even (in the health care area) administrative and overhead efficiencies.
Id.
164. See id. ("It is no accident that we seldom see a challenge of a defense industry
merger, hospital merger, or software merger where four or more surviving competitors re-
main in the relevant market.").
165. Fox, supra note 99, at 732-33.
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Finally, this Note has earlier made the judgment that social goals
should be considered in merger law only in exceptional cases.
Such exceptionality is generally decided by Congress and some-
times by the courts. Congress has on numerous occasions passed
legislation to exempt industries from the general application of the
antitrust laws, such as the newspaper industry,66 the insurance in-
dustry,67 the banking industry," 8 and professional sports. 16 9 The
newspaper example is particularly pertinent here, because the ex-
plicit and only purpose of the Newspaper Preservation Act was
exactly to facilitate the consolidation of failing newspapers, largely
in small towns where often only one general news daily can survive.
Even in the absence of direct Congressional mandate, where in a
specialized field of law there is a detailed regulatory scheme in
place, there is a narrowly-interpreted judicial assumption that the
regulated entities are shielded from antitrust law by virtue of the
octrne. 170This assumption will continue to beimplied immunity d tr. sasmtinwl iu0ob
the right approach once the failing company defense is struck
from antitrust law. If Congress considers that the failing firms in
certain industries merit special treatment, some tailored solution
will be appropriate, because it is preferable to carve exemptions
out of the general rule, rather than to change the antitrust law to
accommodate particular constituencies.
B. Important Benefits
The fact that minimum adjustments are required under this
proposal does not mean it is mere rhetoric. Merger review without
the failing company defense has many important benefits. The
primary advantage is simply doctrinal purity. This Note has demon-
strated that the case generally considered the fountainhead of the
166. Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2000)).
167. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000)).
168. Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7, 7-10 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2000)); see also supra text accompanying note 97.
169. See, e.g., Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 730-33
(1975) (discussing a securities market); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 691
(1975) (discussing a stock market); see also Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2004) (discussing that telecommunication firms do not
enjoy such implied immunity because of the antitrust-specific saving clause § 601 (b) (1) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 143 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
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doctrine could not have created it, the legislative session thought
to have codified it could not have done so, and the modem cases
purported to have revived it have not in fact repaired its doctrinal
deficiency.
Practical benefits are as important as doctrinal gains. Confusions
over the defense have unnecessarily channeled resources from the
defense, the agencies, and the courts, to a process bizarrely outside
an integrated review process that is currently undergoing a con-
structive and fruitful modernization. Without the failing company
defense, merger review will become a unified and streamlined
process, the agencies will more accurately exercise their prosecuto-
rial discretion, and ultimately, economic resources will be saved.
CONCLUSION
This Note advocates that the failing company defense be abol-
ished under federal merger law. The inquiry is not a myth-
debunking expedition. The fundamental defects of the defense are
not entirely unknown. Rooted in a misreading of a conservative
Supreme Court decision, glossed over by a careless session of Con-
gress, and entangled in the ideological war started in a progressive
era, 7 1 the doctrine has had a long life but very few proud moments.
However, it is the costly operational confusions of the defense and
the fact that such confusions are inalienable from its doctrinal de-
ficiency that make reform a current interest. "If one hundred years
of federal antitrust policy have taught us anything, it is that anti-
trust is both political and cyclical.' '7 2 The failing company defense
had its day. It's time to let it go.
171. Is it a pure coincidence that the failing company defense's Supreme Court appear-
ance is sandwiched between the two greatest periods of judicial activism of the twentieth
century? This Note ventures no answer. For a discussion of judicial activism during such
periods, see FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OFJUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE OF
THE WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE (1999).
172. HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 213.
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